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The purpose of this paper is to offer some critical but constructive notes on the notion 
of colonial governmentality which has in the past two decades provided a convenient 
grid for the understanding of relations between colonizers and colonized. It does not 
in any way attempt to engage with or debunk more general ideas on governmentality, 
ideas that Michel Foucault quite magisterially elaborated in some of his later lectures at 
the College de France and elsewhere.1 Taking most of his examples from early modern 
Europe, Foucault devoted a good deal of attention to the theme of modern political 
power; in particular its rationality, sources, character and targets. He suggested that a 
new set of concerns heralded new foci of power – clustered not around the binary of ‘us’ 
	 M.	Foucault,	Sécurité,	Territoire,	Population.	Cours	au	Collège	de	France	 (977–978),	Paris	2004;	 for	a	useful	
synthesis,	see:	G.	Burchell	/	C.	Gordon	/	P.	Miller	(eds.),	The	Foucault	Effect:	Studies	in	Governmentality,	Chicago	
99.
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and ‘them’ but around a more complicated set of concerns about life based on statistical 
probabilities and rational normative discourses. How well do his ideas translate into the 
relations of power that prevailed in the colonized world and how helpful to think with 
and formative of explanation is the concept of colonial governmentality?
I belong to the generation who began writing in the early 1990s in the wake of intel-
lectual giants such as Edward Said, Benedict Anderson, and the Subaltern Studies col-
lective of historians.2 The debt of my generation of scholars to Foucault’s work and that 
of his intercessors cannot be dismissed easily. James C. Scott compared works of great 
originality to a shipyard and suggested that a sure mark of influence was how many ships 
were launched from its dock. I have no doubt, to borrow Scott’s words, that around the 
world “thousands of ships have since sailed forth flying his pennant” and others are still 
ready to sail away.3 But with hindsight it is now clear that while Foucault unlocked a new 
world of interpretation, at the same time he gave us the hubris to think that we were the 
privileged ones who held the key. 
For a scholar of colonialism whose archive was the Sri Lanka British colonial state 
Foucault’s work was an invitation to rethink the story told in the 1960s and 1970s 
by liberal and Marxist scholars alike about the nature of the colonial state – benevo-
lent or extractive – and the relations between colonizers and colonized.4 According to 
these master narratives the state was the privileged site of an immense power standing 
in opposition to a civil society – nested between state and market – imagined either as 
the absence of power or as the fulfillment of freedom. These works that belonged to 
the British empirical tradition were written in a theoretical void, totally divorced from 
the shattering developments in philosophy and social theory encapsulated in the term 
‘poststructuralism’ that were sweeping through continental Europe. Foucault was, for 
instance, painstakingly tracking the emergence in early modern Europe of a new form of 
political rationality which combined simultaneously two seemingly contradictory mo-
dalities of power: one totalizing and centralizing, the other individualizing and normal-
izing. A decade later however, all the certitudes of Sri Lankan colonial historians would 
be questioned by scholars formed in the American and European academia, cognizant 
of Michel Foucault’s 1978 lectures on governmentality as well as parallel radical trends 
emerging closer to home in India. 
It has now become increasingly commonplace, even banal, to understand the circulation 
of power as a decentered process. The excitement of the 1980s and 1990s is gone. Today 
everywhere – with the exception of the Netherlands where postcolonialism is still mar-
ginalized – scholars are using Foucauldian frames to explore the production of colonial 
2	 E.	Said,	Orientalism,	New	York	979;	B.	Anderson,	Imagined	Communities:	Reflections	on	the	Origins	and	Spread	
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subjects.5 Instead of identifying government with the centralized locus of state rule, this 
burgeoning governmentality literature argues that governmental power operates through 
the production of discursive normalizations, political rationalities, and techniques of 
regulation that ultimately produce subjects that behave as they are expected to.
Let me spell out some of my concerns with the generalisations and essentialisation of 
colonial governmentality as well as give just a few insights from my own work to argue 
for the need for a more contextualized, nuanced, and historically attentive approach to 
relations of power in colonial situations.
1. The Production of Colonial Modernity 
One concern I have with the notion of colonial governmentality is the manner in which 
colonialism is essentialized in studies that use it as a grid to read the effects of colonial 
domination on subject populations. This is the case even in theoretically sophisticated 
works of scholars such as Antoinette Burton or David Scott whose underlying thesis is 
that colonization was a universal project that had as its aim to inscribe the colonized in 
the space of modernity.6 One can only agree with Frederick Cooper who has forcefully 
argued that while there were colonial initiatives in the 19th and 20th centuries that might 
be described this way, it makes little sense to say that the sum of such efforts produces 
a ‘colonial modernity’ or that colonial administrators intended them to do so.7 This is 
not to deny that there were such initiatives; one of them being in the field of education 
in India. Gauri Visvanathan has demonstrated to what extent Macaulay’s 1835 Minute 
on Indian Education was designed under the “guise of liberal education” with the aim of 
preventing the risk of native insubordination.8 But can we follow Gyan Prakash when he 
argues that there was a well defined aim to discredit indigenous systems of knowledge to 
ensure that ‘natives’ could be trained with modern scientific methods and lifted into the 
cradle of civilization?9 Anyone who has read minutes of colonial administrators at the 
Public Records Office will agree that most of them did not have the faintest idea what 
they were doing. Beyond the immediate task of running a colony there was no grand 
plan, or if it existed it must have been in the realm of the tentative and the uncertain. 
Ann Laura Stoler makes this point when she shows that although rules of classification of 
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ioned from uncertain knowledge’ and were an ‘unruly and piecemeal venture at best’.10 
The quality of colonial rule is better described as haphazard and tentative. So we must be 
mindful of the slippage in some scholarship from arguments that were articulated from 
within colonial regimes to an “essence of colonial rule” in the modern era.11
We must also avoid facile causal explanations that are present in even the most sophisti-
cated accounts of colonial rule where it is common to read colonial governmentality as 
the mechanism that led to the onset of colonial modernity and its alter ego capitalism in 
the colony. Colonial modernity in turn is made responsible for various transformations 
in the colony. Taking these as self-evident explanatory grids, ‘modernity’ is endowed 
with some kind of agency as in this example taken from a recent work on Africa: “What 
is more, given that modernity has engendered forms of social living that command our 
approbation in different parts of the world….”12
In this example modernity is given a causal significance. The danger with this type of 
explanation is that it casts away other types of analysis and other historical frames. Events 
surely happen owing to multiple agents, actions, forces and processes.
Furthermore, the framing already presupposes the answer. The ‘why’ question, crucial to 
the craft of the historian, disappears when a question is already framed through the lens 
of governmentality / modernity. So my first critique relates to the way the overall history 
of the 19th- and 20th-century colonized territories has been read by some scholars through 
the lens of colonial governmentality or colonial modernity, neglecting the other factors 
that generated change by assuming that colonial rules had a complete political and cul-
tural authority over those it ruled.
2. Colonial Governmentality and Subaltern Studies
Another concern linked to this idea of essentialism is the way one case study (as India 
or Bengal) is used to make universal pronouncements and claims over colonialism – a 
phenomenon that spanned five centuries at least and all continents. Historians from 
India or using India as their archive have argued very forcefully that modern govern-
mentality was imposed upon colonial subjects. From the late 1980s onwards this notion 
reoriented the way power was conceptualized in many studies of the British Raj and of 
other South Asian colonies and the way relations between colonizers and colonized were 
written about. 
The most influential scholarship came indeed from the Subaltern Studies collective of 
Indian historians. Influenced by Foucault but also by Gramsci and rebelling both against 
the nationalist and the Marxist traditions in Indian history, they examined the ways in 
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conditions in which knowledge could be obtained and organized. Inspired by Bernard 
Cohn’s pioneering work, their works centered on the importance British officials attached 
to institutions that defined the subject in relation to the state – the census, the survey, 
and more generally the collection of knowledge that defines a ‘population’ and can be 
used to maintain surveillance and superintend social change.13 These historians creatively 
adapted Foucault’s paradigm by incorporating a reflection on resistance and what was be-
ing resisted. They questioned whether the Foucauldian approach gave adequate tools to 
understand the deflections, reinterpretations and reconfigurations to which indigenous 
peoples subjected colonial power systems. They saw a need to study how modes of power 
were received, lived and transcended.14 But in many ways by privileging texts and their 
exegesis over social being and materiality, subaltern historians tended to replicate the 
axioms and premises of colonial representations.15
These scholars explored to what extent the modes of governmentality that Michel 
Foucault had shown as characterizing modern Europe were deployed in a field of power 
that included the metropole and the colony, in this case India. Gyan Prakash for in-
stance pointed out to what made colonial governmentality profoundly different from 
that which was being enacted in the West, was its absolute need for domination. Unlike 
in the West, he argued the purpose was to dominate in order to liberate.16 
Where these scholars were less cautious was when they implicitly or explicitly applied the 
situation in Bengal or another region of India to the entire subcontinent and even to the 
other colonized worlds. In Sri Lanka, my own work on the construction of authenticity 
as Kandyan Sinhalese shows that colonial rule depended not only on making the indi-
vidual subject understandable within the categories of the state, but on a collectivized 
and reified notion of traditional authority.17 So clearly there was no one single colonial 
situation which calls for a unifying colonial modernity. Cooper has pointed out that the 
situation was quite different in African countries such as Kenya where the first census was 
done in 1948. In many instances, colonial administrators saw little need to classify and 
count or see subjects with relation to the state, as they read them as belonging to tribes 
that were governed through the collectivity.18 
While the Subaltern Studies tried to reveal that there existed a much richer range of 
oppositional movements and ways of thinking than colonial or nationalist elites were 
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of peasant studies were doing the same in a manner that explored forms of politics that 
had often led to alliances between elites and peasants. Their work shows that subalterns 
were quite readily and willingly mobilized by nationalists of various sorts, adopted on 
many occasions non-violent forms of struggle described as ‘elitist’ by Subaltern historians 
and participated in civil disobedience movements in a manner displaying their political 
consciousness. The politics of engagement were more complex than anti-colonial politics 
split between autonomous subalterns and colonized elites.19
Increasingly scholars questioned Ranajit Guha’s formulation that described the particular 
form of power in colonial situations as domination without hegemony – that gave rise 
to particular forms of subaltern politics in which the very non-hegemonic nature of the 
state allowed subaltern groups a considerable measure of autonomy. Chandavarkar for 
instance called out to find ways around “the sterile dichotomies of East and West, science 
and superstition, rationality and rumour which have enveloped the subject”.20 
Most colonial regimes of the 19th and 20th centuries combined coercive domination with 
hegemonic strategies such as dissemination of Christianity, European literature and sci-
ence which trapped subjects within a web of beliefs and values. 
3. Colonial Governmentality in Sri Lanka
I would like to turn to what I think is the most articulate and field defining work on 
governmentality that uses Sri Lanka as an archive; namely the work of anthropologist 
David Scott who developed a line of thinking to move toward a better understanding of 
the operation of colonial power.21 His influential piece set forth ways of understanding 
the political terrains that colonial power made possible: what new forms of subjectivity, 
society, and normalcy Europe’s insertion into the lives of the colonized organized and 
produced. He did so by working through one particular historical instance: what he 
called the “formation of Sri Lanka’s modernity”, which he traced back to British Cey-
lon’s Colebrooke-Cameron constitutional reforms of the early 1830s. These institutional 
changes, Scott skillfully argues constituted a crucial break with the past, ushering in Sri 
Lanka’s modernity by way of “the introduction of a new game of politics that the colo-
nized would (eventually) be obliged to play if they were to be counted as political”.22
David Scott’s work is important because it moves away from the writing back at the West 
strategy of much of the work on colonialism where what is at stake is the way colonialism 
as a practice of power works to include or exclude the colonized (the epistemic violence 
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of colonialist discourse). He tells us the story of Sri Lanka’s colonial modernity along 
the axis of the displacement of one kind of political rationality – that of mercantilism 
or sovereignty up to 1832 – by another, that of governmentality with the Colebrooke-
Cameron reforms. In a nutshell these reforms which followed the arrival of a commis-
sion of enquiry in 1830 introduced the idea of political representation, modern social 
institutions, and a capitalist plantation economy. In Scott’s article and book, the move 
towards colonial modernity is described not in the language of modernization but read 
as a transformation of power, as colonial power adopting a different strategy and working 
on through different targets.
My own work on colonial petitions gives a somewhat different picture of ‘colonial power’ 
where power was much less routinized and normalized and colonial power was under-
stood as made of different and often conflicting forces and individuals.23 Let me give one 
example. Scott argues that through the creation of a modern public sphere colonized 
subjects were recast as modern subjects. But what then of those who were outside this 
enchanted circle, what then of 95 percent of the peoples? Their relation to the colonial 
state cannot be understood through the grid of governmentality. The form of political 
action – the petition – which they used was a political instrument that existed during 
Dutch colonialism (18th century) and if petitions did not succeed in obtaining their 
demands they rebelled. They were outside the field of governmentality and remained so 
well into the 20th century. The petition constituted the domain of those who were not yet 
ready for a ‘civilized government’, for the social groups that John Stuart Mill suggested 
were still under control of the Gods, the spirits and the supernatural beings and who did 
not frequent the same spheres as the bourgeois. Since they had no civic rights they used 
the petition to express their demands and sentiments. The petition is evidence of the 
presence of a dense and heterogeneous time in the colony where the times of the modern 
– of the quasi citizen and of the pre-modern – of populations – were coeval.24 The peti-
tion can thus be understood as a democratic instrument and as a form of political action. 
But it is a double-edged instrument. It favoured direct contacts between plaintiffs and 
authorities but at the same time it did not encourage the formation of political institu-
tions that represented rather than simply listened to grievances of the people. David 
Scott’s analysis of colonial governmentality addressed only those groups that the colonial 
state included in its path towards progress, the English speaking westernized bourgeois 
classes. The politics and voices of the rest, literate in the vernaculars or illiterate who 
expressed their demands in various ways, are not heard. Empirical archival work would 
have revealed another world beyond the text of the Colebrook-Cameron report. Perhaps 
they would uncover singular notions of improvement or progress to which people laid 
claim; or they would show us peoples who reacted to colonial structures with varying 
23	 N.	Wickramasinghe,	La	Petition	Coloniale.	Objet	de	Controle,	Objet	de	Dissidence,	in:	Identity,	Culture	and	Poli-
tics:	An	Afro-Asian	Dialogue,	7	(2006)	,	pp.	82-97.
24	 P.	 Chatterjee,	The	 Politics	 of	 the	 Governed:	 Reflections	 on	 Popular	 Politics	 in	 Most	 of	 the	World,	 New	 Delhi	
2004.
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degrees of instrumentality, or display evidence that people thought with little regard to 
the traditional / modern polarities or even outside that frame altogether.
The words, for instance, that are used today in Sinhala to describe the idea of modern, 
‘nutana’ and ‘navina’, both from Sanskrit, came to common parlance after the 1930s. 
Martin Wickramasinghe, the most reputed Sri Lankan novelist of the 20th century, au-
thor of a seminal work entitled Gamperaliya or The Changing Village, used the term in 
his editorial columns in the two Sinhalese daily newspapers – the Dinamina and the Si-
lumina – in the 1920s and 1930s and also in his other critical works. But in the late 19th 
century these words were not common. Most Sinhalese writers used the term ‘abhinava’ 
or ‘nava’ to denote the period, which literally means ‘new’. Some writers used the term 
‘varthamana’ (the present, the now) to describe their time. For example John de Silva’s 
play Sinhala Parabhavaya Natakaya (1902), a satire on the upper-classes, uses the term 
‘varthamana kalika’, literally the ‘present times’, in the introduction to the play. If an es-
sential part of being modern is thinking you are modern, modernity was understood as 
an aspiration to be with the times. The term we use today (‘nuthanathvaya’) to translate 
‘modernity’ was not used in the early twentieth century.25
What is argued here is that the battles that were fought were not fought on the turf 
of modernity; the positions that were taken were framed differently. How did people 
understand their condition as dominated beings? How did they describe it in their own 
indigenous terms? As historians we owe it to the colonized peoples to understand their 
own framings or rationalities.26
4. In Guise of Conclusion 
Partha Chatterjee, building on Foucault argument, has pointed out that the ideas of par-
ticipatory citizenship that were so much a part of the Enlightenment notion of politics 
have fast retreated before the triumphant advance of governmental technologies that 
have promised to deliver more well-being to more people at less cost.27 “Citizens inhabit 
the domain of theory, populations the domain of policy”.28 Michael Dutton who has 
traced what he calls the after-life of colonial governmentality has a different view on the 
part of disciplinary power. In major crises such as natural disasters or when it is neces-
sary to re-establish norms of governance, “sovereign decisionism” – a term he borrows 
from Carl Schmitt – , “which is an overt form of political intervention, interrupts and 
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disciplinary power worked together, merging into a discourse that attempted to occlude 
the political.30 His work invites us to think again about the nature of the colonial state 
and its everyday impact on the lives of the dominated. Cooper argues that Foucault’s 
reading of power as capillary based on European examples hardly fits colonial contexts 
where power can be described as arterial, strong near the nodal points of colonial author-
ity but less able to impose its discursive grid elsewhere.31 Indeed in Sri Lanka, the Matara 
literature of early 19th century gives no reference to colonial rule, either the Dutch or 
the British, as though the presence and absence of colonial rule was irrelevant. Colonial 
rule was a shadow that loomed upon aspects of their lives that were more concerned 
with other forms of politics or other battles for power and distinction.32 In this sense, we 
can understand the violence of both the state of coloniality and what Mbembe calls the 
‘postcolony’ as about the failure of the disciplinary technologies and governmentalized 
technologies of western modernity to produce modern rational subjects.33
My own work has addressed the role of the census in framing identities and creating 
containers for people to use to claim entitlements from the state. But we have few his-
torical sources to demonstrate that the local people’s forms of self-representation actually 
changed. What many scholars documented was in fact the intentions and perceptions 
of colonial administrators. It is not clear how far the “colonization of the mind” went 
beyond the minds of missionaries and administrators. The reliance on colonial texts 
written in the language of the colonizer even read against the grain answers the near 
obsessive urge to understand how the native was ‘represented’, but gives us only part of 
the story, however compelling it might be. Too much lazy scholarly work, which involves 
a scant use of indigenous sources and limited visits to archives, has paid much attention 
to the way natives are represented – what Ann Stoler calls “the representation machines” 
– rather than how they negotiate with colonial state institutions and the market. Further-
more, the global market outside the frame of empire and new consumption forms surely 
played a role in the shaping of people’s perceptions and worldviews in the late 19th cen-
tury. Historians of the colonial have often overlooked global connections in their refusal 
to see the colonized / disempowered as purely “consumers of modernity” and eagerness 
to see them moving in uncontaminated autonomous cultures that create a reservoir of 
anti-colonialism. If modern subjects were actually created, it was also through various 
mechanisms and efforts that involved appropriating and deflecting colonial policies. Co-
lonial governmentality is best used as a grid alongside others to understand the relations 
between colonized and colonizers.
30	 Ibid.
3	 F.	Cooper,	Colonialism	in	Question	(footnote	7),	p.	48.
32	 See:	N.	Wickramasinghe,	Sri	Lanka	in	the	Modern	Age:	A	History	of	Contested	Identities,	London	2006,	p.	.
33	 A.	Mbembe,	On	the	Postcolony,	Berkeley	200.
